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Abstract
This paper shows that the existence and persistence of ‘overeducation’ can be
explained by an extension of the efficiency wage model. When calibrated to fit
the amounts of overeducation found in most empirical studies, the model implies
that both the relative wage and the relative employment rate of high-skill workers
depend inversely on aggregate economic activity. Keeping aggregate employment
constant, furthermore, low-skill unemployment rises following an increase in the
relative supply of high-skill labor, and relative wages may be insensitive to changes
in relative labor supplies. The model may help explain rising wage inequality in
some countries since the early 1970s.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. It is shown, first, that the existence and persistence
of ‘overeducation’ can be explained by a simple extension of the efficiency wage model.
The model is used, second, to examine the effects on wage inequality and the pattern
of unemployment of ‘neutral’ shocks to aggregate economic activity and of shifts in the
skill composition of the labor force. The presence of overeducation, it turns out, may
reverse the direction of some of these effects, compared to a standard model without
overeducation.
Workers are overeducated if they have education in excess of that required to do their
jobs. Qualifications are not necessarily the same as formal education and the measure-
ment of overeducation involves many difficulties, both conceptual and empirical.1 There
is strong evidence, however, that the incidence of overeducation is substantial. An influ-
ential study by Sicherman (1991) reports that 40 percent of US workers are overeducated,
and Hersch (1991) finds overeducation figures ranging from 28 to 78 percent for different
groups of workers in a sample from Oregon. In the UK, several studies indicate that
about 30 percent of all respondents were overeducated and that the figure may be above
40 percent among those possessing more than the lowest level of qualifications (Sloane et
al. (1999), Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Rigg et al (1990)). Summarizing the evidence,
Green et al (1999, p.15) suggest that “overeducation is a widespread phenomenon both
in Europe and the United States of America”.2
This paper uses an efficiency wage model to account for overeducation. Efficiency
wage models come in many forms. The key element of these models - the dependence of
workers’ productivity on wages - can be related to sociological or psychological factors,
as in Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990), or it may arise in more traditional
models of optimizing behavior, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bowles (1985),
among others.
To simplify the analysis, this paper follows the standard shirking approach of Shapiro
1Green et al (1999) and Hartog (2000) discuss some of the issues involved.
2See also Borghans and de Grip (2000) and the special issue on overeducation in Economics of
Education Review (vol. 19, 2000).
Undereducation - workers who report having less education than required to get the job - also exists.
Quantitatively, most studies indicate that about 10-20 percent of all workers are undereducated. The
existence of undereducation on this scale could indicate ‘credentialism’: a change in the pool of appli-
cants may lead employers to raise the skills required for recruitment to an otherwise unchanged job.
Employers may prefer workers with the ‘required education’ but this level may not be needed to do the
job. The formal model in this paper abstracts from both undereducation and credentialism.
and Stiglitz. The extension of the shirking model lies in the introduction of two types
of workers, high and low skill, and a distinction between the skill requirements of the
job and the skills of the worker. Specifically, it is assumed that there is an asymmetry
between the options of high- and low-skill workers. A high-skill worker who is unable
to get a high-skill job may accept a low-skill wage in a low-skill job for which she is
‘overeducated’. Low-skill workers do not have the analogous option of getting high-
skill jobs. We thus get three no-shirking conditions: for high-skill workers in high-
skill jobs, for high-skill workers in low-skill jobs and for low-skill workers in low-skill
jobs. No-shirking among workers in high-skill jobs is enforced by a combination of open
unemployment and employment in low-paying low-skill jobs; open unemployment, on
the other hand, is the only discipline devise for low-skill jobs.
Overeducation emerges from this analysis in a straightforward way: some high-skill
workers are lucky and get well-paid jobs that utilize their skills while others are unem-
ployed or get less-skilled jobs with a lower pay, that is, they become overeducated. This
asymmetry in the fortunes of otherwise identical workers is similar to the asymmetries
explained by other versions of efficiency wage models. A standard efficiency wage model
explains why, in equilibrium, identical workers may have different employment status
and different levels of income and utility; a multisectoral version of the model allows for
the possibility that identical workers in different sectors may have different wages and
utility levels. In this paper identical workers may be employed in the same firm but with
different jobs and different wages and utility levels.
In order to determine the equilibrium solutions for employment and wages, the no-
shirking conditions are combined with labor demand curves derived from firms’ profit
maximization. Thus, the position of the equilibrium may shift for a number of reasons,
including shifts in the production function, changes in the degree of product market
competition, changes in relative labor supplies or changes in the parameters that define
the wage curves.
This paper first considers the effects of neutral shocks to aggregate economic activity.
A Hicks-neutral shift in the demand for labor, which leaves the proportion of high-skill
jobs constant if the relative wage rate is kept unchanged, represents an example of
this kind of shock. In a standard model without overeducation, neutral shocks cannot
generate a decline in both the relative employment and the relative wage of low-skill
workers. Yet the empirical picture for both the US and the UK shows a dramatic
decline in both relative employment and relative wages between the early 1970s and the
mid 1990s, an observation which has been explained by a combination of skill-biases in
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technical progress, the effects of international competition and institutional changes in
the labor markets. The model in this paper demonstrates that ‘induced overeducation’
may have contributed to the observed changes: a negative, neutral shock to aggregate
employment will raise unemployment among both low- and high-skill workers but since
both groups of unemployed workers compete for low-skill jobs, the relative wage in
low-skill jobs may come under pressure. As a result, one may see an increase in the
proportion of low-skill jobs but a decrease in the proportion of low-skill workers in total
employment. The increase in the proportion of low-skill jobs in turn implies a relative
decline in low-skill wages.
This type of (partial) explanation of the deterioration of both relative employment
and relative wages for low-skill workers has been suggested by, among others, Thurow
(1998) and Skott and Auerbach (2005).3 Thurow discusses a number of reasons for
increasing US wage inequality. He emphasizes the effects of intra OECD trade as a
source of downward pressure on the wages of male workers in traditional industries but
also notes the asymmetry arising from the ability of high-skill workers to get low-skill
jobs (p.31). According to Thurow, unemployed high-skill workers “bump down the
job distribution” (p. 33) but there is no attempt at a more rigorous analysis of the
mechanisms involved. Skott and Auerbach examine the implications of reduced-form
assumptions concerning the proportion of high-skill workers without a high-skill job
that move into a low-skill job. They show that using plausible parameter values and
taking as exogenous the trends in the employment rates for high and low-skill workers,
this framework could explain a large substantial increase in US wage inequality.
Shifts in the composition of the labor supply represents another obvious source of
movements in wage inequality and relative unemployment. If the production function
exhibits constant returns to the two types of labor, the qualitative results are as one
would expect: an increase in the relative supply of high-skill workers will reduce both
low-skill unemployment and the average wage premium to high-skill workers. Endoge-
nous movements in the relative supply of high-skill workers will not, however, eliminate
overeducation. Extended in this way - with the supply of high-skill workers depending
on the average wage premium - the model defines a long-run equilibrium with overedu-
cation.
If there are decreasing returns to the two types of labor, the results can be more
surprising. In this case, an increase in the relative supply of high-skill workers may imply
3Skott (2005) presents a related argument but focuses mainly on the presence of hysteresis in relative
wages and employment.
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that the unemployment rate for low-skill workers rises and the relative wage may also
move against low-skill workers. These perverse effects on unemployment and relative
wages may be empirically unlikely. They are indicative, however, of a more general
feature: in the presence of overeducation, the relative wage may be quite insensitive to
changes in relative labor supplies.
The remainder of this paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 presents the
model. The analysis of neutral changes in aggregate labor demand is in section 3 while
section 4 considers the effects of changes in the relative labor supply. Section 5 contains
a few concluding remarks. Proofs and derivations are collected in appendices 1-4.
2 The model
The economy is closed and produces a single output, Y. There are only two types of
jobs, high and low skill, and two types of workers, high and low skill; a worker’s skill
level is observable. To simplify the exposition, non-labor inputs are disregarded. Thus,
if there is no shirking,
Y = AF (NH , NL) (1)
A > 0; Fi > 0, Fii < 0 for i = H,L; F (0, NL) = F (NH , 0) = 0
where NH and NL denote the number of high- and low-skill jobs that have been filled.
All high-skill jobs are filled by high-skill workers while low-skill jobs may be filled by
either low- or high-skill workers. Non-shirking high- and low-skill workers have the same
productivity in low-skill jobs. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that the function
F satisfies the standard assumptions of constant returns and positive but diminishing
marginal productivity of both inputs. With the exception of proposition 3, the results in
this paper would go through if constant returns were replaced by the weaker assumption
of homotheticity; proposition 4 covers an extreme case of decreasing returns. To avoid
the possibility of degenerate cases with only one type of job, it is assumed that both
jobs are needed to produce a positive output. Changes in the multiplicative constant A
describe Hicks-neutral technical change.
The supplies of high- and low-skill workers are H and L, respectively, and we have
the following accounting relations:
H = NH +NHL + UH
L = NLL + UL
NL = NLL +NHL
4
where Ui is unemployment among workers of type i and NLL and NHL denote low- and
high-skill workers in low-skill jobs; the number of high-skill workers in high-skill jobs is
equal to the number of high-skill jobs NH . The labour supplies H and L are taken to
be fixed in section 3; section 4 considers the effects of changes in the relative supply of
high-skill workers.
The wage structure is determined by efficiency wage considerations and, using a
simple shirking setup, employed workers either “shirk” or “exert effort”. Workers get
instantaneous utility uij given by
uij =
wij − eij if employed and exerting effort
wij if employed and shirking
0 if unemployed
where w and e are wages and the costs in terms of utility of exerting effort; subscripts
i = H,L and j = H,L denote the skills of the worker and the skill requirement of the
job, respectively. This specification implies that shirking raises a worker’s instantaneous
utility. Shirking also increases the worker’s risk of losing the job (since a worker who is
caught shirking will be fired), and the effort/shirking decision is based on this tradeoff.
An increase in the wage raises the cost of job loss and shifts the balance against shirking.
Firms set wages sufficiently high to prevent shirking.
By assumption there are no low-skill workers in high-skill jobs and the skill levels are
observable. Hence, there are three sets of no-shirking conditions, one for each group of
employed workers. In a long-run equilibrium the no-shirking conditions can be written:
ρVHH = wHH − eHH − p(VHH − VHU) + qHHL(VHL − VHH)
= wHH − (p+ δ)(VHH − VHU) + qHHL(VHL − VHH) (2)
ρVHL = wHL − eHL − p(VHL − VHU) + qHLH(VHH − VHL)
= wHL − (p+ δ)(VHL − VHU) + qHLH(VHH − VHL) (3)
ρVLL = wLL − eLL − p(VLL − VLU) = wLL − (p+ δ)(VLL − VLU) (4)
where
ρVHU = qHUH (VHH − VHU) + qHUL(VHL − VHU) (5)
ρVLU = qLUL (VLL − VLU) (6)
The variables Vij (i = H,L; j = H,L, U) denote the present values of the future flows
of utility for a worker of type i with job status j. The parameters ρ, p and δ are the
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discount rate, the exogenous rate of job terminations for non-shirking workers and the
rate of detection for workers that shirk.4 While ρ, p and δ are exogenously given, the
values of the hiring rates q are determined endogenously. Low-skill workers never get
high-skill jobs and their hiring rates into low-skill jobs is qLUL. Unemployed high-skill
workers have hiring rates qHUL and qHUH into low- and high-skill jobs, respectively.
High-skill workers, finally, may move directly from a high- to a low-skill job (if low-skill
jobs are the more attractive) or, alternatively, directly from a low- to a high-skill job
(if high-skill jobs are more attractive). The transition rates for these direct moves are
qHHL and qHLH .
Straightforward manipulation of the no-shirking conditions yields
VHH − VHU =
eHH
δ
(7)
VHL − VHU =
eHL
δ
(8)
VLL − VLU =
eLL
δ
(9)
Comparing (7) and (8) it follows that VHH − VHL = (eHH − eHL)/δ. Thus, the relative
magnitudes of the effort costs eHH and eHL will determine whether high-skill workers
prefer low- or high-skill jobs. Theoretically, as well as empirically, the relevant scenario is
one in which they prefer high-skill jobs. In the rest of this paper I shall therefore assume
that eHH > eHL.5 This assumption implies that no high-skill workers will want to move
to a low-skill job. The transition rate qHHL will therefore be zero. Furthermore, all
high-skill workers are identical and, when filling a high-skill job, firms will be indifferent
between hiring an unemployed high-skill worker or a high-skill worker who is currently in
a low-skill job. Both of these groups of workers want high-skill jobs, and I shall assume
that they have the same hiring rates into high-skill jobs (that is, qHUH = qHLH = qHH).
With these assumptions, the steady state conditions require that the hiring rates
4One might expect the exogenous termination and detection rates, p and δ, to be higher for low-
than for high-skill jobs, while the discount rate ρ may be higher for low- than for high-skill workers.
The combined effects of these differences in the parameters on the no-shirking wages are ambiguous.
Low rates of discount and exogenous termination reduce the no-shirking wage but this effect may be
offset by a low detection rate. To simplify the analysis it is assumed, therefore, that the termination,
detection and discount rates are the same across workers and jobs
5In a more disaggregate setup, high-skill workers need not have a relatively low utility cost of effort
in all low-skill jobs. It is sufficient that for any particular skill there exist some low-skill jobs which a
high-skill person, trained in that area, finds it relatively easy to perform.
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satisfy
pNH = qHH(H −NH)
pNHL + qHHNHL = qHUL(H −NH −NHL)
pNLL = qLUL(L−NLL)
or
qHH =
pNH
H −NH
qHUL =
(p+ qHH)NHL
H −NH −NHL
= p
H
H −NH
NHL
H −NH −NHL
qLUL =
pNLL
L−NLL
= p
NL −NHL
L−NL +NHL
Using these expressions for the hiring rates, equations (2)-(9) can be used to derive the
following wage equations:
wHH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
+ (eHH − eHL)
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ
(10)
wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
(11)
wLL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NLL
δ
(12)
By assumption, only high-skill workers have high-skill jobs, and the productivity of
high- and low-skill workers is the same in low-skill jobs. Hence, if firms maximize profits,
we must have
wHL = wLL = wL if NLL > 0 and NHL > 0 (13)
wLL > wHL = wL if NHL > 0 and NLL = 0 (14)
wHL > wLL = wL if NLL > 0 and NHL = 0 (15)
wHH = wH (16)
where wH and wL denote the wage rates for high and low-skill jobs.
In order to find the equilibrium solution of the model, equations (10)-(16) are com-
bined with firms’ first order conditions with respect to the number of high- and low-skill
jobs. Using (1), these first order conditions are given by:
wH = mAF1(NH , NL)
wL = mAF2(NH , NL)
7
where m ≤ 1 is the inverse of the markup on marginal cost (m = 1 under prefect
competition). The homogeneity of the production function (1) implies that the ratio of
high- to low-skill jobs is an increasing function of the relative wage in low-skill jobs
wL
wH
= φ(
NH
NL
) (17)
where the function φ(.) is unaffected by changes in A and m.
3 Wage effects of neutral shocks to aggregate em-
ployment
3.1 A case with induced overeducation
This section examines the implications of neutral shocks to aggregate employment. A
neutral shock is defined as one that leaves unchanged (i) the relation (17) between
wL/wH and NH/NL, (ii) the relation between (uL, uH , NHH ) and (
wHH
wLL
, wHL
wLL
) implied by
(10)-(12), and (iii) the labor supply ratio H/L. In terms of the model, a Hicks-neutral
shift of the production function, a change in the markup on marginal cost, or a propor-
tional change in the three utility parameters eHH , eHL and eLL could produce neutral
shocks of this kind.6 For present purposes, however, the underlying cause of the shift in
aggregate employment is irrelevant. Moreover, changes in employment are observable
(unlike shifts in underlying parameters). The analysis, therefore, will be cast in terms
of the effects of neutral shocks to total employment.
At an interior solution the wage rates satisfy (10)-(13) and (16). Using (11)-(13),
it follows that the unemployment rate for low-skill workers can be expressed as an
6It is readily seen that shifts of this kind will affect aggregate employment. Consider for example
an upward shift in the production function. By assumption F is linearly homogeneous and it follows
that F1(NH , NL) = F1(NHNL , 1) and F2(NH , NL) = F2(1,
NL
NH ). The first order conditions with respect to
NH and NL therefore imply that an increase in A must produce a rise in wH and / or wL. A rise in
wL translates directly into an fall in unemployment among both groups of workers (use (11)-(12)) and
hence a rise in total employment. Thus, in order to prove that employment will increase we just need
to show that wL must rise.
Assume the contrary. Since both wages cannot fall, the relative wage wL/wH and the employment
ratio NH/NL must therefore fall and, using (11)-(12) the employment rate (NH + NHL)/H will also
fall if wL falls. Equation (10), however, implies that a decline in both NH/NL and (NH + NHL)/H
(and therefore also in NH/H) is inconsistent with a rise in the no-shirking wage wH (since the right
hand side of (10) is increasing in (NH +NHL)/H and NH/H). Thus, the assumption that wL falls has
produced a contradiction.
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increasing function of the unemployment rate for high-skill workers,
uL =
uH
eHL
eLL
+ eHL−eLL
eLL
δ+ρ
p
uH
(18)
where uH = (H − NH −NHL)/H and uL = (L − NLL)/L are the unemployment rates
for the two groups. Equation (18) implies that the unemployment rate for low-skill
workers will exceed the unemployment rate for high-skill workers when eHL < eLL (and
that uL < uH when eHL > eLL). The interesting case - the one that fits the empirical
evidence of relatively low unemployment rates for high-skill workers - arises when the
ratio eHL/eLL is below one, and in what follows I shall focus on this case.
If n = NH + NL is total employment, equations (10)-(13) and (16) imply (see Ap-
pendix 1) that
d log wH
wL
d logn
= En[B(x)
NH
n
d logNH
d logn
− C(y)D(y, z)] (19)
where
x =
H
H −NH
=
1
uH +
NHL
H
y =
L
L+NHL −NL
=
1
uL
z =
H
H −NH −NHL
=
1
uH
B(x) =
L
H
x2
δ + ρ+ px
> 0
C(y) =
y2
δ + ρ+ py
> 0
D(y, z) =
eHL
L
H
z2
eHL
L
H
z2 + eLLy2
> 0
E =
wH − wL
wH
p
1
L
> 0 for eHH > eHL
Using equation (17) we get another relation between changes in relative wages and
relative factor inputs,
d log wH
wL
d logn
= η
µ
d logNL
d logn
− d logNH
d logn
¶
(20)
where η is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution of the production function. From
the definition of total employment, finally, we have
1 = θ
d logNH
d logn
+ (1− θ)d logNL
d log n
(21)
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where θ = NH/n. Combining (19)-(21), the effects of a change in aggregate employment
on relative wages can be derived. We get (see Appendix 2)
d log wH
wL
d logn
= η
n
NL
(1− d logNH
d logn
) (22)
where
d logNH
d logn
=
η +NLEC(y)D(y, z)
η +NLEB(x)
NH
n
(23)
Using (22)-(23) we have the following result:
Proposition 1 At an interior equilibrium with eHH > eHL and eLL > eHL,
• high-skill workers will have a higher average wage and a lower unemployment rate
than low-skill workers.
• an increase in aggregate employment reduces the unemployment rate of both low-
and high-skill workers, but low-skill workers benefit disproportionately: the relative
unemployment rate for low-skill workers, uL/uH , depends inversely on aggregate
employment.
• if Ω = NHL/(NH + NL) denotes the degree of overeducation, the restriction Ω >
Ωcrit = uL/(1 + (1− uL) LH ) is sufficient to ensure an inverse relation between the
relative wage wH/wL and aggregate employment.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
It follows from Proposition 1 that with an unemployment rate among low-skill work-
ers of, say, 0.2 or lower, the wage ratio wH/wL varies inversely with the aggregate rate
of unemployment even if the degree of overeducation is far below the figure of 30-40
percent suggested by most studies.
The wage ratio wH/wL does not capture wage inequality as it is usually mea-
sured. Standard measures of the skill premium focus on the ratio wHA/wL where
wHA =
NH
NH+NHL
wH +
NHL
NH+NHL
wL is the average wage of high-skill workers. Furthermore,
there is within-group inequality among high-skill workers. This within-group inequality
can be described by
σ =
s
NH
NH +NHL
µ
wH − wHA
wHA
¶2
+
NHL
NH +NHL
µ
wL − wHA
wHA
¶2
=
wHA − wL
wHA
r
NHL
NH
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These measures of between- and within-group inequality both depend on the rate of
aggregate employment. We have the following result:
Proposition 2 Assuming that the conditions in Proposition 1 for d log wH
wL
/d logn to be
negative are met,
• the relative wage wHA/wL will vary directly with aggregate employment (that is,
d log wHA
wL
/d logn > 0) if the two types of labor are perfect substitutes in production
(if η → 0).
• depending on parameter values, the relation between the relative wage wHA/wL and
aggregate employment may be inverse or direct when the elasticity of substitution
is finite.
• if the relation between the relative wage wHA/wL and aggregate employment is
inverse then within-group inequality σ will also be inversely related to aggregate
employment.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
3.2 Numerical examples
Proposition 2 fails to give unambiguous results for the relative wage wHA/wL. Numer-
ical analysis, however, suggests an inverse relation between aggregate employment and
inequality for plausible parameter values, unless the existing estimates of overeducation
greatly exaggerate actual overeducation.
Table 1 gives the initial values of the two measures of the relative wage (wH/wL and
wHA/wL) and the within-group dispersion among high-skill workers for different values
of eHL/eLL and eHH/eLL. The table is derived using equations (10)-(13) and (16). Tables
2-3, based on equations (18) and (a10)-(a11) in Appendix 4, show the effects of changes
in employment on overeducation and wage inequality. Most studies (e.g. Card et al.
(1999)) suggest a relatively low elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skill
jobs and the production function is assumed to be either Leontief (Table 2a) or Cobb-
Douglas (Table 2b).7 The initial degree of overeducation and the initial unemployment
7The parameters of the production function are calibrated so as to ensure that the initial employment
and wage rates (derived from (10)-(13) and (16)) are consistent with profit maximisation. If eHL = 0
and eHH = eLL = 1, for instance, the parameter assumptions and the initial values of overeducation
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rate for low-skill workers are 0.3 and 0.1, respectively, in Tables 1-2; these initial values
are changed to 0.1 and 0.2 in Table 3. All tables use δ = 1, ρ = 0.1, p = 0.2 and L = H.8
Table 1: Wage inequality for different values of eHL/eLL and eHH/eLL
(δ = 1, ρ = 0.1, p = 0.2;L = H;Ω = 0.3, NLL/L = 0.9)
eHH/eLL = 1
eHL/eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
wH/wL wHA/wL σ
1.47
1.37
1.28
1.18
1.09
1.00
1.20
1.16
1.12
1.08
1.04
1.00
0.19
0.16
0.12
0.08
0.04
0.00
uH
wHA(NH+NHL)
wHNH+wLNL
0 0.57
0.01 0.56
0.03 0.55
0.05 0.53
0.07 0.52
0.1 0.5
eHL/eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
eHH/eLL = 2
wH/wL wHA/wL σ
1.93
1.84
1.74
1.65
1.55
1.46
1.40
1.36
1.31
1.27
1.23
1.18
0.33
0.31
0.28
0.25
0.22
0.19
uH
wHA(NH+NHL)
wHNH+wLNL
0 0.61
0.01 0.60
0.03 0.59
0.05 0.57
0.07 0.56
0.1 0.54
As indicated by Table 1, the relative wage of high-skill workers is decreasing in
eHL/eLL but increasing in eHH/eLL. The intuition is straightforward. An increase in
eHL/eLL tightens the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers in low-skill jobs and
puts upward pressure on the relative wage for low-skill jobs; an increase in eHH/eLL,
analogously, tightens the no-shirking condition for high-skill jobs and raises the high-skill
wage premium.9
and unemployment for low-skill workers in Table 2 imply that the production functions are given by
Y = min {λHNH , λLNL} with λH/λL = 3.42 in the Leontief case and Y = NαHN1−αL with α = 0.30 in
the Cobb-Douglas case.
8The value p = 0.2 implies that just over 18 percent of all workers will lose (or choose to leave) their
jobs within one period; δ = 1 implies that a shirking worker has a 63 percent probability of detection
within one period.
9There is full employment for high-skill workers if eHL = 0. If their cost of effort is zero, high-skill
workers in low-skill jobs will never shirk. Hence, the ‘wage curve’ for workers in low-skill jobs becomes
horizontal at wL = 0 until all high-skill workers have a job; further increases in output requires the use
12
The wage premium obtained by high-skill workers in Table 1 is not due to a skill
shortage. The high-skill wage is high because many high-skill workers get low-skill jobs.
Thus, suppose that high-skill workers were precluded from low-skill jobs. Using the same
parameter values, relative labor supplies and initial employment rate for low-skill workers
as in Table 1, this preclusion implies that if, for example, eHH = eLL and eHL = 0, the
initial employment rate and relative wage for high-skill workers would be NH/H = 0.26
and wH/wL = 0.44 in the Leontief case and NH/H = 0.69 and wH/wL = 0.56 in
the Cobb-Douglas case. Thus, without overeducation high-skill workers would have
experienced lower employment and lower wage rates than low-skill workers.
Table 2a: Effects of changes in aggregate employment on overeducation and wage
inequality: The Leontief case.
(δ = 1, ρ = 0.1, p = 0.2;L = H;Ω = 0.3, NLL/L = 0.9; η →∞)
eHH/eLL = 1
eHL
eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
dΩ
d logn
d log(wH/wL)
d logn
d log(wHA/wL)
d logn
dσ
d logn
−0.53
−0.43
−0.33
−0.23
−0.11
0.00
−3.85
−2.97
−2.11
−1.30
−0.59
0.00
−1.86
−1.38
−0.95
−0.56
−0.24
0.00
−1.95
−1.50
−1.06
−0.65
−0.29
0.00
eHH/eLL = 2
eHL
eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
dΩ
d logn
d log(wH/wL)
d logn
d log(wHA/wL)
d logn
dσ
d logn
−0.53
−0.43
−0.33
−0.23
−0.11
0.00
−5.84
−4.98
−4.12
−3.28
−2.49
−1.78
−3.18
−2.66
−2.15
−1.68
−1.25
−0.88
−2.90
−2.49
−2.08
−1.66
−1.27
−0.91
of low—skill workers and their no-shirking condition now determines the wage. It follows that when wL
is positive, there is no open unemployment among high-skill workers if eHL = 0. Those that fail to get
a high-skill job get a low-skill job instead, bumping out low-skill workers in the process.
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Table 2b: Effects of changes in aggregate employment on overeducation and wage
inequality: The Cobb-Douglas case.
(δ = 1, ρ = 0.1, p = 0.2;L = H;Ω = 0.3, NLL/L = 0.9; η = 1)
eHH/eLL = 1
eHL
eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
dΩ
d logn
d log(wH/wL)
d logn
d log(wHA/wL)
d logn
dσ
d logn
−1.17
−0.93
−0.68
−0.44
−0.21
0.00
−3.68
−2.86
−2.05
−1.28
−0.58
0.00
−1.29
−1.03
−0.75
−0.48
−0.23
0.00
−1.89
−1.45
−1.03
−0.64
−0.29
0.00
eHH/eLL = 2
eHL
eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
dΩ
d logn
d log(wH/wL)
d logn
d log(wHA/wL)
d logn
dσ
d logn
−1.48
−1.25
−1.00
−0.75
−0.51
−0.28
−5.47
−4.70
−3.91
−3.13
−2.40
−1.72
−1.74
−1.53
−1.31
−1.08
−0.85
−0.64
−2.95
−2.50
−2.06
−1.63
−1.23
−0.88
Turning to Tables 2a-2b, an increase in aggregate employment reduces both measures
of the relative wage as long as eHL/eLL is less than one. Thus, the numerical analysis
suggests that when there is a substantial overeducation, the elasticity of the relative
wage wHA/wL with respect to aggregate employment will be negative for a wide range of
parameter values. From Proposition 1 it now follows that a rise in aggregate employment
will benefit low-skill workers in terms of both relative wages and relative employment.
As shown by Proposition 1, however, the degree of overeducation in combination
with the unemployment rate for low-skill workers can be critical for the relation between
relative wages and aggregate employment, and measures of overeducation, in particular,
are subject to considerable uncertainty. Table 3 presents the implications of assuming
initial values of 0.1 and 0.2 for overeducation and low-skill unemployment, respectively.
Even with these less favorable assumptions, an increase in aggregate employment will
lead to a reduction in the average skill premium in almost all cases. The only exceptions
arise when the production function is Cobb-Douglas and the ratio eHL/eLL is below 0.4.
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Table 3: Effects of changes in aggregate employment on overeducation and wage
inequality when initial rates of overeducation and low-skill employment are low
(δ = 1, ρ = 0.1, p = 0.2;L = H; eHH/eLL = 2;Ω = 0.1, NLL/L = 0.8)
Leontief
eHL
eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
dΩ
d logn
d log(wH/wL)
d logn
d log(wHA/wL)
d logn
dσ
d logn
−0.56
−0.50
−0.42
−0.31
−0.17
0.00
−1.35
−1.34
−1.26
−1.09
−0.85
−0.58
−0.63
−0.71
−0.73
−0.69
−0.61
−0.50
−0.93
−0.83
−0.70
−0.54
−0.35
−0.16
Cobb-Douglas
eHL
eLL
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
dΩ
d logn
d log(wH/wL)
d logn
d log(wHA/wL)
d logn
dσ
d logn
−0.74
−0.69
−0.62
−0.50
−0.34
−0.12
−0.73
−0.80
−0.82
−0.79
−0.68
−0.50
0.20
0.06
−0.08
−0.20
−0.28
−0.32
−1.12
−1.02
−0.89
−0.71
−0.49
−0.24
The key empirical question is not so much the precise calibration of the model to
match the levels and changes of relative wages to real-world data. The model is highly
stylized and empirical counterparts for relative wages, for instance, depend on the de-
lineation of high and low skill. More importantly, the model deliberately leaves out
many aspects that may have influenced real-world developments. The mechanism of in-
duced overeducation, however, is at the center of the model. The key question therefore
concerns the robustness and likely magnitude of the effects of induced overeducation.
Numerical exercises, like the ones above, may shed some light on this issue but the im-
plications of induced overeducation described in Propositions 1-2 clearly invite further
empirical testing. Unfortunately, most empirical studies of overeducation rely on surveys
for a particular year and, to my knowledge, the direct evidence on induced changes of
this kind is limited and inconclusive. Short-run data on movements in overeducation,
moreover, may be hard to interpret.
The steady-state focus of the theoretical model in section 2 makes the model ill-
suited to the analysis of short-term fluctuations but disregarding this problem, there
are additional complications: the short-run effects of induced overeducation may be
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offset by the effects of differential labor hoarding. Like induced overeducation, differ-
ential labour hoarding implies that low-skill workers are affected disproportionately by
unemployment, but the underlying mechanism and the effects on measured overeduca-
tion are different. Induced overeducation focuses on the effects on different groups of
workers of proportional changes in the number of high- and low-skill jobs; differential
labour hoarding, on the other hand, suggests that temporary changes in demand will
lead to non-proportional changes in the number of jobs, and when high-skill workers in
low-skill jobs are laid off as a result of differential labour hoarding, there is a tendency
for overeducation to decrease.10 A priori it is difficult to say which of these effects will
dominate in the short run.11 In the medium term, however, differential hoarding ceases
to be important and we would expect a negative correlation between employment and
overeducation.
With respect to medium and long-run trends, UK evidence suggests that the in-
cidence of overeducation increased strongly between the 1970s and 1980s (a period of
rising unemployment) but may have stabilized since the late 1980s (Green et al (1999)).
Robinson and Manacorda (1997, p. 3) find that in the UK between 1984 and 1994
“the increase in the supply of better educated labour has allowed firms to indulge in
‘credentialism’, employing more highly qualified staff to do jobs which previously were
done by less qualified staff”. Furthermore, in the UK an index of required qualifications
rose between 1986 and 1992, but then fell slightly during the period of falling unemploy-
ment from 1992 to 1997 (Green et al (2000)). In the US, the evidence is ambiguous.
Wolff (2000, p. 27) concludes that between 1950 and 1990 there has been a growing
mismatch “between skill requirements of the workplace and the educational attainment
of the workforce, with the latter increasing much more rapidly than the former”. Daly
et al. (2000), on the other hand, find a decline in overeducation between 1976 and 1985.
With a rapid rise in average years of schooling, however, overeducation may increasingly
take the form of a discrepancy between actual and required quality of education, and a
focus on years of schooling will fail to register any overeducation if, for instance, MIT
graduates accept jobs which otherwise could and would have been filled by graduates
10The measure of overeducation may be biassed in a downturn, however. According to Doeringer and
Piore (1971) large American firms with well-developed internal labor markets respond to a temporary
decline in demand by laying off unskilled workers and letting their skilled workers take over unskilled
tasks.
11There is some evidence that differential labour hoarding may dominate in the short run. Thus,
using Dutch data from the 1990s, Gautier (2000) reports that the proportion of high-skill workers in
low-skill positions falls in a recession.
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from less prestigious institutions.
3.3 The case without overeducation
A corner solution without overeducation (NHL = 0) can be obtained if the value of
eHL/eLL is sufficiently high.12 In this case high-skill workers will exert no effort when
the wage rate satisfies the no-shirking condition for low-skill workers. Algebraically,
we may have eHL
³
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
´
> eLL
³
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NLL
´
, when NHL = 0 and
(NH , NL) satisfy firms’ first order conditions. That is, we may have
eHH
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ
= mAF1(NH , NL) = wH (24)
eHL
µ
δ + ρ+ p
H
H −NH
¶
> eLL
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NL
δ
= mAF2(NH , NL) = wL (25)
Now consider the effects of a change in aggregate employment in this “standard case”
where all workers have the exact skills to match the requirements of their jobs. Using
(20)-(21) and (24)-(25), tedious but straightforward calculations imply that
d log wH
wL
d log n
= η
n
NL
∙
1− d logNH
d logn
¸
= η
n
NL
(1− θ)
³
h( H
H−NH )− h(
L
L−NL )
´
η + (1− θ)h( H
H−NH ) + θh(
L
L−NL )
(26)
where the function h(x), x > 1, is defined by
h(x) =
x2
δ + ρ+ px
x− 1
x
;h > 0, h0 > 0 for x > 1
The function h is increasing in the relevant range and it follows that the numerator of
(26) is positive if and only if the employment rate for high-skill workers exceeds that
12Analogously, if eHL/eLL is sufficiently low and the supply of high-skill workers is large (relative to
total employment, NH +NL), we get a corner solution with NLL = 0.
A solution with NHL = 0 may also obtain in the case where eHL/eHH ≥ 1 if the supply of low-skill
workers is sufficiently large. If high-skill workers find the effort associated with low-skill jobs more
onerous than high-skill jobs then the no-shirking condition will require that they are paid a relatively
high wage in low-skill jobs. If they were to be offered a low-skill job at this wage, they would be
better off than in a high-skill job. If there are enough low-skill workers, however, the high value of the
no-shirking wage wHL will mean simply that firms fill all low-skill jobs with low-skill workers, paying
wLL < wHL.
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for low-skill workers (NH/H > NL/L). An increase in aggregate employment, in other
words, will raise the relative wage of high-skill workers in the empirically relevant case
whereNH/H > NL/L. The reason is straightforward. With an unchanged relative wage,
firms would choose the same proportional increase in employment for the two groups.
This proportional increase in employment would cause a disproportionate decline in the
unemployment rate for high-skill workers, who initially have the lowest unemployment
rate, and, given the non-linearity of the wage equations (24)-(25), the relative wage for
high-skill workers would have to rise. An increase in output, therefore, must lead to a
rise in the relative employment of low-skill workers and a decline in their relative wage.
4 Shifts in relative labor supply
The existence of a wage premium serves as an incentive for workers to invest in skills. As
a simple, reduced-form specification, we may assume that the relative labor supply H/L
adjusts towards an equilibrium level (H/L)∗ determined by the relative wage wHA/wL :µ
H
L
¶∗
= ψ(
wHA
wL
), ψ0 > 0 (27)
The endogenization of relative skill supplies along these lines does not automatically
eliminate overeducation since, as pointed out in section 3, large amounts of overeducation
can be consistent with a relative wage wHA/wL that is significantly above one. Using
the benchmark values in table 1 and assuming eHH/eLL = 1, for instance, the relative
supply of high-skill workers would tend to increase - despite 30 percent overeducation - if
eHL/eLL ≤ 0.6 and ψ(1.25) = 1. Using equation (27) instead of an exogenous factor ratio
merely generates long-run solutions for relative factor supplies as well as for employment
rates, overeducation and wages.
Assuming that the model in section 2 describes the determination of relative wages
for given factor supplies, one may ask whether slow adjustments in factor supplies will
take the economy to a stationary solution satisfying (27). Proposition 3 suggests an
affirmative answer.13
13The model in section 2 describes steady state solutions associated with given factor supplies. Even
if the changes in relative supplies are slow, these steady state solutions for the relative wages may be
misleading. Moreover, the adjustment process for relative factor supplies should take into account ex-
pected future changes in relative wages. The inverse relation between wHA/wL and H/L in proposition
3, therefore, is merely suggestive of a stable adjustment process.
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Proposition 3 Assume that the production function (1) exhibits constant returns. At
an interior equilibrium with eHH > eHL and eLL > eHL, an increase in the factor ratio
H/L generates
• a decline in the wage ratios wH/wL and wHA/wL,
• a decline in the unemployment rates for high- and low-skill workers, uH and uL,
as well as in the average unemployment rate u, and
• an increase in overeducation Ω.
Proof: See Appendix 5.
The results in proposition 3 are quite intuitive. The increase in the supply of high-skill
workers puts downward pressure on high-skill wages and sends more high-skill workers
into jobs for which they are overeducated. Overeducation in turn represents a kind
of hidden underemployment. It acts as a disciplining device and, as a result, less open
unemployment is needed to prevent shirking. In the case of constant returns to (NH , NL)
the downward pressure an average unemployment will be associated with declines in the
unemployment rates for high- and low-skill workers as well as in the two wage ratios.
These conclusions with respect to uH , uL, wH/wL and wHA/wL need not hold under
decreasing returns. Decreasing returns implies that the response of total employment
to changes in the skill composition of the labor force may be quite small.14 Since the
weights in the expression for average unemployment (u = H
H+L
uH+
L
H+L
uL) change when
the composition of the labor force changes, a small decline in u can be associated with
an increase in both uH and uL. Moreover, if both of these unemployment rates increase,
the wage ratios may also go up. Thus, it may be useful to analyze the effects of changes
in relative supplies from a slightly different angle.
The observable variables are employment and factor supplies, and section 3 analyzed
the pure case of neutral changes in employment with factor supplies kept constant. I
now examine the other pure case in which factor supplies change but aggregate employ-
ment is kept constant. This constancy of aggregate employment could be the result
14This is seen most clearly, perhaps, by considering a simple limiting case in which
Y = min{NH ,NL,M}
whereM can be interpreted as some fixed resource constraint (land, for instance). In this limiting case,
an increase in H has no effect on employment if the resource constraint is binding at the initial position.
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of a combination of changes in relative labor supplies and neutral shocks to aggregate
employment. However, the case of constant aggregate employment also covers a scenario
without employment shocks but with extreme decreasing returns, as in footnote 14.
Consider first the effects on the pattern of employment of an increase in the propor-
tion of high-skill workers, assuming that the economy is initially at an interior equilib-
rium and that eHL < eLL. Using equation (18) we know that uL > uH and that uL is a
increasing function of uH . Since
u =
H
H + L
uH +
L
H + L
uL
it therefore follows that if aggregate unemployment is kept constant, an increase in
H/(H+L) implies a rise in the unemployment rates of both low- and high-skill workers:
as the composition of the labor force shifts toward to the group with a relatively low
unemployment rate, the unemployment rates of both groups rise to compensate and keep
aggregate unemployment constant. But equation (18) also implies that as uH rises, the
ratio uL/uH must go up. Thus, the increases in the group-specific unemployment rates
are skewed toward the low-skill workers. In terms of employment prospects, low-skill
workers are hurt more than high-skill workers by an increase in the relative supply of
high-skill workers.
The presence of overeducation also affects the sensitivity of the relative wage to
changes in the relative labor supply. Consider, for example, the implications of a
change in the relative labor supply from (H,L) = (1, 1) to (H,L) = (0.5, 1.5), (H,L) =
(1.5, 0.5), (H,L) = (1.9, 0.1) or (H,L) = (1.95, 0.05). Using the parameter values in
Tables 1 and 2 and assuming that the aggregate employment rate is kept constant, these
massive changes in the skill composition of the labor force are reflected in the degree of
overeducation and, to a lesser extent, within-group inequality. But, as indicated in Table
4, the wage ratio wH/wL need not decline monotonically as the proportion of high-skill
workers increases. In fact, a 57-fold increase in H/L from H/L = 1/3 to H/L = 19,
is associated with a rise in this wage ratio. The average wage premium wHA/wL, and
hence the incentives to enter a training programme, also changes in a non-monotonic
way, rising slightly as the relative supply increases from H/L = 19 to H/L = 39. Con-
sidering the magnitude of the changes in relative supply, moreover, the movements in
in the wage ratios are quite modest. It should be noted, finally, that in the numeri-
cal examples the implications are strikingly similar for the Leontief and Cobb-Douglas
specifications. This similarity is closely related to the other findings: if the wage ratio
wH/wL (as determined by the non-shirking conditions) does not change much in the
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Leontief case where NH/NL is fixed, firms will have little incentive to change their input
proportions in the Cobb-Douglas case.
Proposition 4 summarizes these results:
Proposition 4 Consider a combination of neutral employment shocks and changes in
the relative labor supply that leave aggregate employment unchanged. At an interior
equilibrium with eHH > eHL and eLL > eHL, an increase in the relative supply of high-
skill workers
• leads to a rise in the unemployment rates of both high- and low-skill workers.
• leads to an increase in the relative unemployment rate for low-skill workers, uL/uH .
• can in some cases lead to a rise in all three measures of wage inequality: wH/wL, wHA/wL
and σ.
Table 4: Wage inequality for different values of the relative supply
of labour
(δ = 1, ρ = 0.1, p = 0.2; eHH/eLL = 2, eHL = 0.4;n = 0.95)
Leontief case (Y = Amin{3.684NH , NL})
H = 0.5, L = 1.5
H = 1, L = 1
H = 1.5, L = 0.5
H = 1.9, L = 0.1
Ω wH/wL wHA/wL σ
0.04
0.30
0.55
0.74
1.78
1.61
1.74
1.95
1.645
1.255
1.205
1.213
0.18
0.24
0.27
0.33
Cobb-Douglas case (Y = ANαHN
1−α
L ;α = 0.3048)
H = 0.5, L = 1.5
H = 1, L = 1
H = 1.5, L = 0.5
H = 1.9, L = 0.1
H = 1.95, L = 0.05
Ω wH/wL wHA/wL σ
0.05
0.30
0.56
0.77
0.80
1.72
1.61
1.73
1.95
1.99
1.565
1.256
1.193
1.182
1.183
0.19
0.24
0.27
0.32
0.33
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper has demonstrated, first, that the existence and persistence of overeducation
can be explained by efficiency wage considerations. By construction, the relative supply
of high-skill workers in the numerical examples in section 3.2 was such that had high-
skill workers been precluded from low-skill jobs, their wage would have fallen below
that of low-skill workers. High-skill workers therefore had an incentive to seek low-
skill employment, employers had an incentive to hire them, and the efficiency-wage
equilibrium was characterized by a wage premium to workers in high-skill jobs. This
wage premium provides an incentive for workers to acquire the high skill, even though
they face a risk of spending at least part of their working life in low-skill jobs. Thus,
there is no reason to expect overeducation to be eliminated by endogenous changes in
the relative supply of high-skill labor.
It has been shown, second, that the presence of overeducation may have profound
effects on the reaction of the economy to different shocks. When calibrated to fit the
amounts of overeducation found in most empirical studies, the model predicts that both
the relative wage and the relative employment rate of high-skill workers will depend
inversely on the aggregate rate of employment.15 Induced changes in the degree of overe-
ducation lie behind these results: an increase in aggregate employment pulls high-skill
workers out of low-skill jobs and leads to a disproportionate increase in the employment
rate for low-skill workers. The presence of overeducation also produces paradoxical ef-
fects following a change in relative labor supplies. Holding constant the average employ-
ment rate, an increase in the supply of high-skill labor hurts the employment prospects
of low-skill workers, and in extreme cases the skill premium also increases.
The analysis, needless to say, has been based on a simplified model. Efficiency
wage models are not the only explanations of structural unemployment, and it remains
an open question whether induced changes in overeducation could play a similar role
within alternative theoretical frameworks, including search and matching theories and
insider/outsider models. The Shapiro-Stiglitz approach to efficiency wages, moreover,
has been criticized by, among others, Carmichael (1985) for its exclusion of bonding
or job selling. Other efficiency-wage theories, including Akerlof-type models of gift
exchange or ‘fair wages’, are immune to the bonding critique. Without restrictions
on the specification of the norms of fairness, however, it is almost too easy to generate
15Even if the degree of overeducation is insufficient to reverse the sign of d log wHwL /d logn and ensure
that low-skill workers benefit form a rise in output, both in terms of relative employment and relative
wages, the presence of induced overeducation will reduce the value of d log wHwL /d logn.
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induced overeducation in models of this kind.16 Despite its potential vulnerability to the
bonding critique, the Shapiro-Stiglitz setting therefore provides a more stringent test of
the induced-overeducation hypothesis. Accepting a Shapiro-Stiglitz setup, however, one
might question the restrictions eHL < eHH and eHL < eLL on the relative magnitudes of
the direct utility costs associated with non-shirking. These restrictions - which are not,
I believe, a priori implausible - were imposed because without them the efficiency wage
model cannot capture the key stylized facts that (i) high-skill workers prefer high-skill
jobs and (ii) low-skill workers have a relatively high unemployment rate. Thus, the two
restrictions define the interesting, empirically relevant case.
It should be noted, finally, that the derivation of the non-shirking conditions assumed
a steady state. The steady-state assumption could be relaxed along the lines of Kimball
(1994), but the analysis would then need to consider the complications arising from
different adjustment speeds for high- and low-skill employment in response to shocks.
These complications associated with fluctuations in employment and differential labor
hoarding become less important as the time frame is extended. Although it is ill-suited
in its present form for the analysis of short term fluctuations, the model may therefore
be relevant for medium and long-term changes in unemployment and wage inequality.
Induced changes in the degree of overeducation may have contributed to the pattern
of rising relative unemployment for low-skill workers and rising wage inequality, both
within and between groups, that has been observed in a number of countries.
6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix 1
Using (10), (11), (13) and (16), we get
wH
wL
= 1 +
eHH − eHL
eLL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NLL
16Skott (2005) introduces overeducation in a model in which workers’ effort is related to the perceived
fairness of wages. The main focus of this paper, however, is on the implications of endogenous changes
in the norms of fairness.
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Hence,
d log wH
wL
d log n
=
d log
µ
1 + eHH−eHL
eLL
δ+ρ+p HH−NH
δ+ρ+p LL−NLL
¶
d logn
=
wL
wH
eHH − eHL
eLL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NLL
⎛
⎝
d log
³
δ+ρ+p HH−NH
´
d logn
−
d log
³
δ+ρ+p LL−NLL
´
d logn
⎞
⎠
=
wL
wH
wH − wL
wL
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
p H
(H−NH)
2NH
δ+ρ+p HH−NH
d logNH
d logn
−
p L
(L−NLL)
2
δ+ρ+p LL−NLL
d(NL−NHL)
d logn
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
=
wH − wL
wH
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
p H
(H−NH)
2NH
δ+ρ+p HH−NH
d logNH
d logn
−
p L
(L−NLL)
2NL
δ+ρ+p LL−NLL
d logNL
d logn
+
p L
(L−NLL)
2NHL
δ+ρ+p LL−NLL
d logNHL
d logn
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (a1)
To get an expression for d logNHL/d logn, we combine equations (11)-(13) to get
eHL
δ + ρ+ p H
H−NH−NHL
δ
= eLL
δ + ρ+ p L
L−NLL
δ
Hence,
eHL
H
H −NH −NHL
d log (H −NH −NHL)
d logn
= eLL
L
L−NLL
d log (L−NLL)
d logn
= eLL
L
L+NHL −NL
d log (L+NHL −NL)
d log n
or
eHL
H
(H −NH −NHL)2
(NH
d logNH
d log n
+NHL
d logNHL
d logn
)
= eLL
L
(L+NHL −NL)2
(NL
d logNL
d log n
−NHL
d logNHL
d logn
)
Rearranging this equation, we get
d logNHL
d log n
=
1
NHL
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
eLL
L
(L+NHL−NL)
2
eHL
H
(H−NH−NHL)
2+eLL
L
(L+NHL−NL)
2
NL
d logNL
d logn
−
eHL
H
(H−NH−NHL)
2
eHL
H
(H−NH−NHL)
2+eLL
L
(L+NHL−NL)
2
NH
d logNH
d logn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (a2)
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Substituting this expression into (a1) gives
d log wH
wL
d log n
=
wH − wL
wH
p
1
L
⎡
⎣
³ L
H x
2
δ+ρ+px
− y2
δ+ρ+py
eHL
L
H z
2
eHL
L
H z
2+eLLy2
´
NH
d logNH
d logn
− y2
δ+ρ+py
³
1− eLLy2
eHL
L
H z
2+eLLy2
´
NL
d logNL
d logn
⎤
⎦
=
wH − wL
wH
p
1
L
"
L
H
x2
δ + ρ+ px
NH
d logNH
d logn
− y
2
δ + ρ+ py
eHL
L
H
z2
eHL
L
H
z2 + eLLy2
n
#
= En
∙
B(x)
NH
n
d logNH
d logn
− C(y)D(y, z)
¸
(a3)
where
x =
H
H −NH
=
1
uH +
NHL
H
y =
L
L+NHL −NL
=
1
uL
z =
H
H −NH −NHL
=
1
uH
E =
wH − wL
wH
p
1
L
> 0 for eHH > eHL
B(x) =
L
H
x2
δ + ρ+ px
> 0
C(y) =
y2
δ + ρ+ py
> 0
D(y, z) =
eHL
L
H
z2
eHL
L
H
z2 + eLLy2
> 0
6.2 Appendix 2
Profit maximization implies that
d log wH
wL
d log NL
NH
= η
Using n = NH +NL and thus 1 = NHn
d logNH
d logn
+ (1− NH
n
)d logNL
d logn
, it follows that
d log wH
wL
d logn
= η
n
NL
(1− d logNH
d logn
) (a4)
Combining (a3)-(a4), we get
η
n
NL
(1− d logNH
d logn
) = En
∙
B(x)
NH
n
d logNH
d logn
− C(y)D(y, z)
¸
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or
d logNH
d log n
=
η
NL
+EC(y)D(y, z)
η
NL
+EB(x)NH
n
(a5)
6.3 Appendix 3
Proof of proposition 1:
The results about the levels of the relative wage and relative unemployment and
about the effects on changes in aggregate employment on relative unemployment follow
directly from equations (10)-(13), (16) and (18).
To derive the relative-wage effects of changes in aggregate employment, note first
that from (22)-(23) it follows that a general rise in economic activity will reduce wage
inequality if and only if
EC(y)D(y, z) > EB(x)
NH
n
(a6)
The value of D(y, z) is decreasing as a function of the ratio eHL/eLL, and we have
D(y, z) = L
L+H
for eHL = eLL. To see this, note that at an interior solution we have
eHL(δ + ρ+ pz) = eLL(δ + ρ+ py) (a7)
and
z =
eLL(δ + ρ+ py)− eHL(δ + ρ)
eHLp
Hence,
eHL
L
H
z2 =
L
H
1
p2
1
eHL
[eLL(δ + ρ+ py)− eHL(δ + ρ)]2 (a8)
For eHL = eLL we get z = y (using (a7)), and from the definition of D(y, z) in com-
bination with it follows (using (a8)) that D is decreasing in eHL and (using (a7)) that
D(y, z) = L/(L+H) if eHL = eLL.
B,C and D are all positive and E is positive when eHH > eHL. Thus, using (a6)
and given the assumptions eHH > eHL and eLL > eHL, we have the following suffi-
cient condition for an inverse relation between the relative wage wH/wL and aggregate
employment:
C(y)
L
L+H
> B(x)
NH
n
or
NH
H
¡
1− NH
H
¢−2
δ + ρ+ p
¡
1− NH
H
¢−1 < NLLL ¡1− NLLL ¢−2
δ + ρ+ p
¡
1− NLL
L
¢−1 nH + L LNLL (a9)
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The function f(x) = x(1 − x)−2/(δ + ρ + p(1 − x)−1) is increasing in x for x < 1. It
follows, therefore, from (a9) that NH/H < NLL/L < n/(H +L) is a sufficient condition
for d log wH
wL
/d log n to be negative.
The second of these inequalities is always satisfied when eHL < eLL since in this
case the employment rate for high-skill workers ((NH + NHL)/H) will exceed that for
low-skill workers (cf. equation 18), and the average employment rate (n/(H + L) is
a weighted average of the employment rates for the two groups. The first inequality
will be satisfied as long as the degree of overeducation exceeds a critical value given by
Ω > Ωcrit = (1 − NLL/L)/(1 + NLL/H) where Ω = NHL/(NH + NL) is the degree of
overeducation. To see this, observe that
NHL = Ω(NH +NL) = Ω (NH +NHL +NLL)
and
(1− Ω)(H −NH) ≥ (1− Ω)NHL = Ω(NH +NLL)
Hence,
NH
H
≤ 1− Ω(1 + NLL
H
)
and
NLL
L
>
NH
H
will be satisfied for
Ω >
1− NLL
L
1 + NLL
H
6.4 Appendix 4
Proof of Proposition 2:
By definition,
wHA =
NH
NH +NHL
wH +
NHL
NH +NHL
wL
Hence,
wHA
wL
= 1 +
NH
NH +NHL
(
wH
wL
− 1)
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and
d log wHA
wL
d log n
=
wL
wHA
NH
NH +NHL
(
wH
wL
− 1)
⎛
⎝
d log
³
NH
NH+NHL
´
d logn
+
d log(wH
wL
− 1)
d log n
⎞
⎠
=
wL
wHA
NH
NH +NHL
"
wH − wL
wL
Ã
d logNH
d logn
− NH
NH+NHL
d logNH
d logn
− NHL
NH+NHL
d logNHL
d logn
!
+
wH
wL
d log wH
wL
d logn
#
=
wL
wHA
NH
NH +NHL
∙
wH − wL
wL
NHL
NH +NHL
µ
d logNH
d log n
− d logNHL
d log n
¶
+
wH
wL
d log wH
wL
d log n
¸
Substituting from (a2), we get
d log wHA
wL
d log n
=
wL
wHA
NH
NH +NHL
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
wH−wL
wL
NHL
NH+NHL
Ã ³
1 +D(y, z) NH
NHL
´
d logNH
d logn
−(1−D(y, z)) NL
NHL
d logNL
d logn
!
+wH
wL
d log
wH
wL
d logn
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
and, using d logNL
d logn
= n
NL
1− NH
NL
d logNH
d logn
,
d log wHA
wL
d logn
=
wL
wHA
NH
NH +NHL⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
wH−wL
wL
NHL
NH+NHL
" ³
1 +D(y, z) NH
NHL
+ (1−D(y, z)) NH
NHL
´
d logNH
d logn
−(1−D(y, z)) NL
NHL
n
NL
#
+wH
wL
d log
wH
wL
d logn
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
=
wL
wHA
NH
NH +NHL
⎧
⎨
⎩
wH−wL
wL
h
d logNH
d logn
− (1−D(y, z)) n
NH+NHL
i
+wH
wL
d log
wH
wL
d logn
⎫
⎬
⎭ (a10)
The term in square brackets is positive if the conditions for
d log
wH
wL
d logn
to be negative
are met. To see this, note first that d logNH
d logn
> 1 when
d log
wH
wL
d logn
< 0. The term D(y, z),
second, is greater than or equal to L
L+H
(cf. Appendix 3) and hence
(1−D(y, z)) n
NH +NHL
<
H
L+H
n
NH +NHL
< 1
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the overall employment rate ( n
L+H
)
is a weighted average of the employment rates for the two groups. Since, by assumption,
the utility costs of effort are such that high-skill workers have the higher employment
rate, it follows that NH+NHL
H
> n
L+H
.
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Using (a4)-(a5) it is readily seen that
d log
wH
wL
d logn
→ 0 for η → 0. The term in square
brackets on the right hand side of (a10), on the other hand is bounded above zero. It
follows that
d log
wHA
wL
d logn
will be positive for sufficiently small values of η. But both d logNH
d logn
and
d log
wH
wL
d logn
are increasing in η - use (a4)-(a5) - and the numerical examples in section
3.2 demonstrate that, depending on parameter values and initial employment values,
d log
wHA
wL
d logn
may be either positive or negative for positive values of η.
With respect to within-group inequality we have
dσ
d logn
= σ[
d log wHA−wL
wHA
d logn
+ 0.5(
d logNHL
d log n
− d logNH
d log n
)]
Using equation (a2) this can be rewritten
dσ
d log n
= σ[
d log wHA−wL
wHA
d log n
+ 0.5(
1
NHL
((1−D(y, z))n−NH
d logNH
d log n
)− d logNH
d logn
)]
= σ
"
wL
wHA−wL
d log
wHA
wL
d logn
+ 0.5(1−D(y, z)) n
NHL
−
0.5NH+NHL
NHL
d logNH
d logn
#
(a11)
Since D ≥ L/(L+H) and (NH +NHL)/H ≥ n/(L+H) (cf. above) we then get
dσ
d log n
≤ σ[ wL
wHA − wL
d log wHA
wL
d log n
+ 0.5
NH +NHL
NHL
(1− d logNH
d logn
)]
Now, d logNH/d log n > 1 if d log(wHA/wL)/d logn < 0 and it follows that if between-
group inequality is inversely related to aggregate employment, the relation between
within-group inequality and employment will also be inverse.
6.5 Appendix 5
Proof of proposition 3:
An increase in H/L will generate an increase in wL. To see this, assume the contrary,
that is, assume that wL falls. By assumption there are constant returns to labor and
the high-skill wage wH therefore must increase if wL falls. It now follows that we get
an increase in NL/NH (using (17)), an increase in uH and uL (using (12) and (18)),
and an increase in NH/H (using (10)-(11) and the rise in wH − wL). An increase in
NL/NH , NH/H, uL and H/L, however, implies that NLLH =
NLL
L
L
H
will fall and that
NL
H
= NL
NH
NH
H
will rise. Hence, NHL
H
= NL
H
− NLL
H
will rise. But a simultaneous increase
in both NH/H and NHL/H is inconsistent with a rise in high-skill unemployment uH .
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Thus, we have a contradiction and it follows that wL must rise following an increase in
H/L.
Using the result that wL must increase, the statements in the proposition now follow:
• the fall in wH and wH/wL follows from firms’ first order conditions and the linear
homogeneity of the production function
• the fall in uH and uL follows from the no-shirking conditions (11)-(12). The fall
in average unemployment, u = H
H+L
uH +
L
H+L
uL, follows from the fall in both uH
and uL and the result that uL > uH (from equation (18)).
• the fall in wHA
wL
= NH
NH+NHL
wH
wL
+1 follows from the decline in wH/wL and an increase
in NHL/NH . To get the latter result, note that NHLNH =
NHL
H
H
NH
and that NH/H
must fall (using (12) and the decline in wH − wL) while NHL/H must rise (since
both uH and NH/H fall).
• the rise in overeducation Ω = NHL
NH+NL
= NHL/NH
1+NL/NH
follows from the rise in NHL/NH
and fall in NL/NH .
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